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Abstract 
Based on a study of the emergence of EMA as a new managerial domain and of how EMA costs the 
environment, the paper examines the institutionalisation of EMA. This is accomplished by linking 
EMA to the broader discourse of economic efficiency. Moreover, the paper contends that the 
institutionalisation of EMA is supported through the legitimacy it produces for individuals (notably 
environmental managers) and organizations. Through the use of different metrics, EMA frames the 
environment in terms of the well known – money – and establishes equivalence between the actions 
to protect the environment and changes in the bottom line.  
 
Informed by actor network theory, the paper suggests that non-human actors such as the calculative 
devices and the material artefacts necessary for providing the inputs for these devices not only 
construct the environmental costs and benefits but also the institutional entrepreneur. The human 
and non-human actors emerge by virtue of their relations to one another. The institutional 
entrepreneur is part of a heterogeneous network encompassing both human and non-human actors. 
The durability/stability of these networks is precarious, i.e. subject to contestation. Against this 
backdrop, the paper suggests that introducing the institutional entrepreneur – alone – as the 
‘champion of change’ does not capture the complexity, instability, and unpredictability of 
institutional change. The paper concludes that the notion of institutional entrepreneurship may even 
be somewhat misleading.  
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Introduction 
What to do when seeking to explain institutional change? Bring in the institutional entrepreneur! 
After all, there has to be someone to make the changes. This seems to be what DiMaggio (1988:14) 
is saying in the often cited quote: “New institutions arise when organized actors with sufficient 
resources (institutional entrepreneurs) see in them an opportunity to realize interest that they value 
highly.” In unpacking this quote, it appears that institutional entrepreneurs are presumed to have a 
clear idea of their interests and that they can rank them highly (or lowly). Moreover, they also have 
the strategic intent and ability to mobilize others to act in accordance with their interests. Actors do, 
undoubtedly, precipitate changes, but, nevertheless, it appears as if this conceptualization of the 
institutional entrepreneur has quite a rationalistic ring to it. One is left with the impression that 
institutional change can be planned and brought about by individuals or groups of actors that are 
persuasive and perhaps even powerful. Intentionality presides, back-grounding the un-intended and 
unanticipated consequences. Although new institutional theory has been criticized for offering too 
much attention to stability and structure (isomorphism), attributing institutional change to 
institutional entrepreneurs, the way that DiMaggio (1988) does, appears to go to the other extreme 
in privileging the purposefulness of these entrepreneurs. 
 This paper seeks to develop a third position,1 one that some would say seeks to do 
away with this (and other) dichotomies. Rather than explaining institutional change in terms of 
institutional entrepreneurial agency, the paper offers an account of how new institutions may 
emerge as the network effect of assemblages of human and non-human actors. This introduces not 
only more complexity and uncertainty into the explanation it also introduces instability. Indeed, one 
implication of taking this perspective is that the concept of institutional entrepreneurship may be 
misleading. 
 The empirical grounding of the paper is a case study of the institutionalization of a 
new management practice within the domain of environmental management, namely environmental 
management accounting. This is a relatively new management tool that entails “the management of 
environmental and economic performance through the development and implementation of 
appropriate environment-related accounting systems and practices. While this may include 
reporting and auditing in some companies, EMA typically involves life-cycle costing, full-cost 
accounting, benefits assessment, and strategic planning for environmental management 
(International Federation of Accountants (1998:xx). There are many different groups and 
                                                 
1 There is a fourth position focusing on field level changes, but here it seems as if changes in structures and logics come 
about by themselves; as if “there are ghosts in the machine.” 
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organizations involved in making a call for EMA: Among the more prolific are the accountants and 
management consultants seeking to peddle their wares (accounting, managerial assistance and 
auditing), but the call is also being made by policy makers nationally and internationally as well as 
by representatives from some NGOs.2 Businesses, government agencies and NGOs in over 25 
countries are involved in promoting EMA, and there appears to be a growing consensus among 
these professionals that ‘something must be done’ to make the costs and benefits of environmental 
management visible and to demonstrate the value of environmental management.  
 There is, as Marilyn Strathern observes (2000:xx) ‘nothing innocent about making the 
invisible visible,’  and one can, by analogy, contend that there is nothing innocent about 
demonstrating the value of environmental management. The aim of this study/paper is to 
demonstrate how the value of environmental management is constructed in different contexts by 
analysing who uses what language, calculative devices (formulas) and arguments in seeking to 
promote and institutionalise EMA. The case study will look at the ‘work’ of those seeking to 
promote EMA – the ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ as it were – and of a selected number of companies 
seeking to implement/use EMA. The case study is thus an account of the discursive construction of 
EMA and of how managers make sense of this new tool. 
The paper offers a theoretical understanding of institutional change that draws on 
discourse analysis and actor network theory but challenges much of the literature on institutional 
entrepreneurs by providing a perspective that emphasizes the ways in which actors promoting 
change justify it, and highlights the importance of inscriptions and material artefacts in the making 
of these arguments. The institutional entrepreneurs do not bring about change single-handedly, but 
enrol, marshal and arrange different resources to form a network that stabilizes their claims as 
‘facts’. EMA is a network effect, and it offers a timely site for delving into not only the material and 
discursive complexity of institutional change but also into the construction of profits and costs, 
opportunities and risks – into the construction of the economics. 
 
Reconfiguring the institutional entrepreneurs 
Admittedly there are many perspectives on the issue of institutional change, and this paper takes 
only one to task, i.e. NIT. After a very brief re-cap of the main lines of argument in NIT, the paper 
                                                 
2 The US Environmental Protection Agency has, for instance, funded the establishment of the EMA Research 
Information Center (200x); the United Nations Division for Sustainable Development convenes meetings of an expert 
group on EMA; and some of these experts – representatives from national governments, professional accounting 
organizations, NGOs – have formed an EMA-network, EMAN. 
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sets out to unpack the three key notions institutions, change and entrepreneurs, arguing that the 
former regulates behaviour, but comes in many ‘shapes, forms, and sizes.’ The notion of change is 
tricky, and begs the question of how do we know change when we see it? Although there are 
various nomenclatures for change to help us – incremental versus radical, small versus systemic, 
micro versus macro level changes, etc. – the paper suggests an evolutionary, emergent approach to 
understanding change.  
The third concept to be discussed in this section is that of the entrepreneur, the 
purposeful actor that seizes opportunities to make things happen. It appears as if there is almost an 
echoing of Mancur Olson’s rational choice arguments regarding collective action (1971/65) in parts 
of the literature on institutional entrepreneurialism – the institutional entrepreneur’s success 
depends on the resources at his/her/their disposal, their abilities to ‘sway’ others, the number of 
people involved and the power that they have, etc. Not that resources, skills and power aren’t 
important, but if we want to understand the way these things work, then, following Law (1992), we 
shouldn’t start out by assuming what it is that is to be explained. They ways in which resources 
become resources, skills become skills and power is played out is not something that is given – it is 
an effect of negotiations between heterogeneous actors.  Rather than focussing on characteristics of 
the institutional entrepreneur, the paper looks more closely at all the things – the heterogeneity of 
the actors – involved in making the institutional entrepreneur perform and, perhaps, bringing about 
institutional change.  
 Drawing on actor network theory institutional change is considered in terms of actors 
enrolling, mobilizing and translating heterogeneous resources – texts, other people, technologies, 
nature – to form networks. These networks encompass both humans and non-humans actors that 
emerge by virtue of their relationship to each other. The temporal ordering of a field, usually 
associated with the actions of an institutional entrepreneur, is according to this perspective an effect 
generated by such networks of heterogeneous actors. The institutional entrepreneur is engulfed or 
entangled in webs of relations that can facilitate or hinder purposeful action in often unpredictable 
ways. Institutional change is about changes in translation and the reconfiguring of the relations 
between actors as these are continuously contested, negotiated and re-negotiated. The perspective 
that this offers on change is a temporal one; one in which past actions incrementally influence 
present actions (the workings of the networks); weaving the past and the present together in a 
complex fabric of interrelationships; and one in which change in one area can have far reaching 
effects in other areas thus rendering the effect of change quite unpredictable. 
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EMA – “at the margins of accounting” 
EMA is very much, as Peter Miller (1998:175) notes, at “the margins of accounting”, but “…it is, at 
the margins that we see new calculative practices added to the repertoire of accounting.” It is this 
adding to the repertoire that is of interest: How is it done?  
 The answer to this question will be provided  by (1) a discursive analysis of key texts 
produced by the proponents of EMA, the ‘institutional entrepreneurs’, (2) case studies of how 
companies are seeking to implement/use this managerial practice.  
The first part of the study will demonstrate how EMA is discursively constructed as a 
managerial domain. Emphasis will particularly be given to identifying the calculative devices that 
constitute EMA. As Callon (1998:24) notes: “Not only do accounting tools constitutes spaces of 
calculability and define the way the calculation is made up, but also, through the reactions they 
provoke, new calculative strategies emerge which lead to changing goals. An analysis that fails to 
take these tools into account would be unable to understand the emergence and logic of calculative 
agencies, for all decisions are the outcomes of this [accounting, sg] complex calculating system.” 
The calculative devices, like other practices of writing, contribute to the construction of the object – 
in this case the environment and environmental costs. EMA is not a ‘neutral’ technical practice that 
simply describes the economics of environmental performance. Rather, it shapes the forms of 
visibility given to the environment and the environmental costs, and in doing so works in specific 
ways to shape behaviour.  
This is taken up in the second part of the study that focuses on EMA practices in 
specific companies. This allows for a situated account of the discourse, techniques, metrics and 
practices that demonstrate the value of environmental management – the costs and benefits, the 
opportunities and risks. This part of the study will investigate the calculative practices of key actors 
and address the seemingly straightforward question of ‘what counts’ in EMA and ‘what doesn’t 
count’ as ‘internal costs’ to the company? What counts and doesn’t count as costs to society for 
which the company is (usually) not held responsible? How is the future factored in? Moreover, how 
does the framing of environmental costs influence the ways decision makers ‘see’ environmental 
management activities – are they business opportunities or a matter of minimizing risks? This is in 
part a matter of framing, but it is also a matter of sense-making, and begs the question of the link 
between the two. 
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The discussion of the case ‘findings’ will draw on Callon’s (1998) re-
conceptualization of externalities as overflows, the notion of environmental costs will always be 
open to contestation, and that the ways in which they are discursive constituted or framed (in 
formulas and accompanying texts) can only be stabilized temporarily. Framing is fragile and 
involves a number of ‘things’: a delineation of rights (who has to the right to do what – an issue 
which in itself is highly contestable); establishing a metrology to measure changes in the 
environment and in the companies environmental performance and impacts so as to establish the 
causal relations between cause and effect (emission/damage); and establishing a common currency 
for measuring things, i.e. money. It appears as if EMA gets its legitimacy by establishing 
equivalence between actions and monetary gains/losses and through references to well-known 
disciplines – accounting and environmental economics. Accounting offers the tools and economics 
the mode of justification (Thèvenot, et al., 2003). It is a justification based on the market. “These 
justifications consider the worth of things only in terms of price, and support a very short-term 
construction of time in which the market competition ‘test’ is the basis for evaluation” (Thévenot, et 
al., 2003:240). My hunch is that EMA will only be stabilized as a new managerial practice (or 
institution) by drawing on market-justifications or economically grounded discourses to increase the 
number of actors – allies – making a case for EMA. Conventional environmental economics 
thinking appears to be quite instrumental in this regard, particularly in light of the stronger emphasis 
given to efficiency in the policy discourse over the last few years. One could, perhaps, contend that 
the discourse of environmentalism or the ‘green’ mode of justification is loosing terrain relative to 
the efficiency discourse or the market mode of justifying action. This is an open question.  
In way of concluding, EMA will be used as an example to shed light on the discursive 
and material dimensions of the institutionalisation. Discourses evolve in disparate and 
geographically dispersed communities (of different types of environmental professionals), but need 
to have material forms – conference presentations, reports, and formulas – in order to circulate. 
These materials are grounded in yet other forms of materiality, namely all the technologies, 
substances, and practices involved in providing ‘input’ to the presentations, reports, and 
calculations. The accounts made in the reports etc. may or may not provide for convincing reading. 
If so, they can help build allies that can take action. So, there is a mess of actors involved. To 
picture the institutional entrepreneurs as the ones bringing about change without taking all these 
other things into consideration tells only part of the story and is therefore too simplistic and perhaps 
even misleading. 
 6
  
References  
Callon, M. 1998. An Essay on  Framing and Overflowing: Economic Externalities revisited by 
Sociology. In M. Callon (ed.): The Law of the Market. Oxford: Blackwell. p. 244-269. 
 
DiMaggio, P. J. 1988. Interest and Agency in Institutional Theory. In L. G. Zucker (ed.): 
Institutional Patterns and Organizations: Culture and Environment. Cambridge, MA.: Ballinger. p. 
3-22. 
 
International Federation of Accountants. 1998. Environmental Management in organizations: The 
role of management accounting. NewYork: International Federation of Accountants. 
 
Law, J. 1992. Notes on the Theory of the Actor-Network: Ordering, Strategy, and Heterogeneity. 
Systems Practice. Vol. 5 No. 4: 379-393. 
 
Miller, P. 1998. The Margins of Accounting. In M. Callon (ed.): The Law of the Market. Oxford: 
Blackwell. p. 174-193. 
 
Olson, M. 1965/71. The Logic of Collective Action – Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. 
Cambridge, MA. 
 
Strathern, M. 2000. The Tyranny of Transparency in Nowotny, H. and M. Weiss (eds.) Shifting 
boundaries of the Real – making the invisible visible. Zürich: VdfVerlag. 
 
Thévenot, L. and M. Lamont. 2000. Rethinking Comparative Sociology – Repetoires of Evaluation 
in France and the United States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 7
